















True to at least Burton Dreben's word, lifelong friend and student of Quine, it is simply irresponsible to study Quine apart from Carnap (Dreben, 1990)​[1]​. It could even be said that Quine's dedication to Carnap as his "teacher and friend" (Quine 1960) was far more than a polite gesture; without Carnap, there might not have been a Quine. Or at least, Quine as we know him. In fact, as if to underline this very point, Quine writes in his short essay "Homage to Rudolph Carnap" (1970) that: "Carnap was my greatest teacher … I was his disciple for six years. In later years his views went on evolving and so did mine in divergent ways.” “But,” he immediately continues: “Even where we disagreed he was still setting the theme; the line of my thought was largely determined by problems that I thought his position presented." (Quine 1976: 41)  These problems, at their most general level, revolved around what Russell once gave the title of a book: Our Knowledge of the External World (1914). For the fundamental questions that initially drove Russell, then Carnap, and eventually Quine, were simple, although perplexing: What does our knowledge of the external world consist of and how do we acquire it? In what sense is it certain, and/or justifiable, if at all?	
	But I certainly can’t give an exhaustive account of how Carnap influenced Quine here—that would take a book. Instead, I focus on explicating just a small portion of what I think is the central tension between these two philosophers. In particular, I claim that Quine reacted to three epistemological circles he believed to be present in Carnap’s work. Here, I focus on what we may identify as the first circle: The “rational reconstruction” (Carnap 1967: 158) of knowledge in the Logische Aufbau der Welt, where knowledge seems to paradoxically emerge from knowledge.​[2]​
	
2	The Aufbau; a General Overview

The early Carnap was the champion of the great Russellian project in Our Knowledge of the External World, ​[3]​ which was, according to Quine, the explication of the "construction" of the external world from bits of sense data. (Quine 1981: 83) In the Aufbau, this consisted of “attempt[ing] to apply the theory of relations to the task of analyzing reality.” (Carnap 1967:7) That is, for his method of construction, Carnap employs the theory of relations as it was laid out by Russell and Whitehead in the Principia. Broadly speaking, this means that Carnap attempted to show that all concepts/objects​[4]​ may be understood as logically "reducible," or translatable​[5]​ to the primary relation “remembering as similar” (what we may also refer to as R) and certain unanalyzable “elementary experiences” (what we may also refer to as E) (see Carnap 1967: Chapter C). In this respect, Carnap hoped to "rationally reconstruct" the concepts of all fields of knowledge (including science) by showing that they may be translated into the strictly formal world of a "constructional language." This constructed language served as a model for how all fields of knowledge may be redefined, or in other words, logically reduced to R and elementary experiences.​[6]​ 
As far as reducing concept/objects to other concept/objects goes, and conversely, constructing concepts/objects out of other concepts/objects, Carnap explains that:

“if an object a is reducible to objects b, c, then all statements about a can be transformed into statements about b, c. To reduce a to b, or to construct a out of b, c, means to produce a general rule that indicates for each individual case how a statement about a must be transformed in order to yield a statement about b, c. This rule of translation we call a constructional rule or constructional definition.” (Carnap 1967: 6)

That is, "construction rules" are the rules that allow us to change any statement about a into given statements about b and c, provided that the concept/object a is "reducible to," namely, may be redefined as the concept/objects b, c. Keep in mind that an accurate “statement”—or as Carnap also puts it, a “definition”—concerning  a concept/object should be understood as a knowledge claim (see Carnap 1967: Chapter A). Also note the following passage (which refers back to Chapter A): “[science] can restrict itself to statements about structures, since all objects of knowledge are not content, but form, and since they can be represented as structural entities (cf. §15 f)” (Carnap 1967: 107). In other words, the “object” of knowledge in this case is a “structure,” where the knowledge claim is the “statement” about that structure.
Ultimately, as Carnap explains in Part III, Chapter C of the Aufbau, all basic concepts/objects may then, by a method he calls “quasi-analysis,” be reduced to a network of “basic relations,” (Carnap 1967: 98) where, as noted earlier, the relation that is logically primary is R, (“remembering as similar”) and the components that these relations obtain of consist of E (unanalyzable “elementary experiences”). However, “analyzing” “unanalyzable wholes” (namely, “elementary experiences”) appears to be somewhat problematic. As a result, Carnap explains that “quasi-analysis” is actually “a synthesis which wears the garb of an analysis.” (Carnap 1967: 121; emphasis added). So, although the construction/reduction process of translating concepts/objects into other concepts/objects in the Aufbau is strictly analytic, the method of constructing-from/reducing-to concepts/objects by way of “quasi-analysis” is synthetic. As a result, a reduction to the objects created by quasi-analysis, is, analogously, a reduction to the elementary experiences and R, a point that is behind Carnap’s remark that “the subjective origin of all knowledge claims lies in the contents of experiences and their connections” (Carnap 1967: 7; emphasis added). For our purposes, this means that according to Carnap, all knowledge claims are first reducible to the products of quasi analysis (“basic relations” (§§75-83) which obtain of elementary experiences), and then second, analogously, by way of quasi-analysis, to the elementary experiences themselves, and R.

3	Quine’s Reaction to “Radical” Reductionism: A Sensitivity to Circularity

3.1 “Attenuated” v. “Radical” Reductionism

As is well-known, Quine rejects the idea that any claim can, both in principle and in practice, be confirmed or denied on the basis of just experience. This rejection is behind his attack on the “second” dogma of empiricism, i.e. “synthetic” claims. Quine’s renouncement of the synthetic amounts to a repudiation of what he refers to as a “subtler and more tenuous form” (Quine 1980: 40) of reductionism, or what we can refer to, after Quine, as “attenuated” reductionism (Quine 1980: 41; emphasis added). Meanwhile, it is also well-known that Quine rejects what he construes as Carnap’s “radical” (Quine 1980: 39; emphasis added) reductionism, where, as explained in §1 above, it is alleged that all statements may be reduced, or in other words, translated into sense data (E) and R. Or as Quine puts it: 

“Radical reductionism, conceived now with statements as units, set itself the task of specifying a sense-datum language and showing how to translate the rest of significant discourse, statement by statement, into it. Carnap embarked on this project in the Aufbau” (Quine, 1980: 39; emphasis added).​[7]​

3.2 The Paradox of Radical Reductionism

On the face of it, it seems that Quine eschewed the notion of “synthetic” claims—and so, the theory of “attenuated” reductionism—because of his holism. According to the holist, no sentence stands or falls on its own, regardless of what the empirical evidence tells us. Instead, the Quinean story goes, whether or not we reject or accept a given sentence depends on its relationship to the rest of the theory at hand: “statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually, but only as a corporate body.” (Quine 1980: 41)​[8]​ 
But I think that the reasons behind Quine’s rejection of attenuated reductionism are more complex than this, although Quine never directly says as much. To see why this appears to have been the case, we must first understand how and why Quine rejected the paradoxical “radical” reductionism manifest in the Aufbau. To begin, note a particularly revealing line from Quine’s 1993 paper “In Praise of Observation Sentences:” "The lively objection to [protocol sentences], as vehicles of evidence for our knowledge of the external world, is that they already assume such knowledge” However, he continues, “the answer is that they need not.” (Quine 1993: 108; emphasis added).  Here, Quine is defending the idea that his notion of an “observation sentence—” a term that he uses interchangeably in this paper with the term “protocol sentence—” is not, in the course of the human being’s learning process, initially “theory-laden” (Quine 1993: 110). Rather, our initial use of language is purely reflexive; a product of our being habituated to say a given sentence S when we experience a given range of neural intake M (Quine 1993: 109). Only later (through a process that is not relevant for us to examine) do human beings acquire theory, and relatedly, knowledge. But why does Quine balk at the idea that our observation sentences somehow initially “assume” knowledge?
Two reasons, where the first, and most well-known is: According to Quine, science tells us that our initial input is remarkable “meager” (Quine 1995: 16), consisting of “the mere impacts of rays and particles on our surfaces and a few odds and ends such as the strain as walking uphill” (Quine 1995: 16). In this respect, our initial input consists of unrelated bits and pieces of sense data. So, we are not “aware” of such nerves firing (see at least Quine 1995: 17-18, and 1974: 2-4). Instead, this input must be understood as our body’s initial and unconscious state of reacting to the world. This is the case not only when we are infants and first experience the world, but also as our “outermost” interface with the world assails us throughout our lives. Thus, “knowing—“ where, according to Quine, knowing consists of at least some kind of psychological ability to evaluate data such that we may say the right thing at the right time, and as a result, at the very least, be “aware” of what is being experienced and what to say​[9]​—is simply not an option at this stage of our data acquisition. Rather, according to Quine, our initial, most outermost interface with the world occurs at what he characterizes as the the purely “receptual” (Quine 1995: 17) level of data acquisition. Accordingly, “awareness,” and so, the possibility of knowledge occurs only at the “perceptual” (Quine 1995:17) stage of data acquisition.​[10]​ 
Second, although Quine never explicitly says so, it seems that assuming knowledge in our initial experience of the world incurs the second horn of Meno’s Paradox, i.e., “[A man] would not seek what he knows, for since he knows it, there is no need of inquiry.” (Cooper 1997: Meno 80 d-e). To see why, we must briefly re-examine what is going on behind the scenes in Carnap’s Aufbau. In particular, realize that if any statements about a concept/object a are, in fact “translat[able” (FLPV; TDE; 39) or in other words, are logically equivalent to some set of elementary experiences E and the relation of R, it seems that in virtue of just experiencing E and knowing R and the theory of relations, we must simultaneously know a and any statements about a as well—at least implicitly—much in the same way that if we know A  B and we know our equivalence rules, then we know ~A v B. For again, if it is the case that all concepts/objects may be reduced (namely, are logically equivalent to elementary experiences and R), then it seems that all our possible knowledge of the external world (including scientific theory) “lies in” (Carnap 1967: 7) our “elementary experiences” and R, if only in the respect that “lies in” means logically equivalent to.​[11]​ For as noted above, the Aufbau’s reductionist program was modeled after the logistic reduction carried out in the Principia (although the latter engaged in a fatally flawed reduction, as pointed out by Gödel (1931)). In fact, Quine writes in From Stimulus to Science:

“The conclusion [Whitehead and Russell] drew was that mathematics is translatable into pure logic (FSS 9)…[The] total translatability [of mathematics and their basic laws and interrelations] into just elementary logic and a single familiar two-place predicate, membership, is of itself a philosophical sensation (FSS 9-10; emphases added)…Russell adumbrated [the idea of this kind of construction] in Our Knowledge of the External World, and a dozen years later, Rudolf Carnap was undertaking to carry it out. Carnap’s effort found expression in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (1928).” (Quine 1995: 10; first two emphases added)

	However as far as I can tell, Quine did not overtly reject the Aufbau because all knowledge that is possibly derivative of a given elementary experience E, the relation R and the theory of relations, is it seems, “assumed” in these primary elements. Rather, he accuses Carnap of embracing a “mentalistic monism” in the Aufbau because, Quine asserts, “elementary experiences” were psychological “global units” (Quine 1995: 10) that consisted of “the individual’s total experience at that moment” (Quine 1995: 10).​[12]​ As a result, Quine explains, these psychologically experienced wholes were, according to gestalt psychologists—as well as according to Carnap—units  that one is necessarily “aware of” (Quine 1974:1-4) when they are being experienced. And in the respect that one would be “aware” of such units, one would, at least to some inchoate degree, know them. So, as Quine sees it, according to this psycho-epistemological account of the world, “awareness of” was roughly equivalent to “knowledge of”—such “wholes” were alleged to be the psychological foundations of knowledge (Quine 1974: 1-4).
So, on the face of it, it does not appear that Quine calls the Aufbau a “sort of fiction” (Quine 1993: 116) and “make believe” (Quine 1969: 75) because it invokes the second horn of Meno’s Paradox. However, this must be understood as his deeper objection; overt or not. Carnap’s “mentalism,” or what Quine also refers to as his “phenomenomalism” (Quine 1995: 15-16) is not just unconvincing because it incurs vague and suspicious mental entities (“elementary experiences”), but worse still, these entities allegedly admit of immediate awareness, and so, knowledge of the world. And not just rudimentary knowledge, but, it seems, knowledge that is logically equivalent to all the theories and knowledge claims possibly derivative of a given elementary experience or experiences. Note in fact, where Quine does somewhat obliquely admit as much in “Epistemology Naturalized” (1968), paying particular attention to the idea that it would be nice, Quine thinks, if we could show that all of science is translatable to “logic, observation terms and set theory” (Quine 1969: 76), and so, “[show] that everything done with the one apparatus could in principle be done with other” (Quine 1969: 76). But quite frankly, he tells us, this is impossible. 
So, it’s clear that Quine did think that the Aufbauian project was paradoxical, although not quite in Meno’s respect that we would be unmotivated to learn what we already know. Rather, it is simply not possible that in virtue of just “elementary experiences” and R that we simultaneously know all of what we eventually come to learn, particularly, scientific theory. Or as Quine puts it: “certainly we did not grow up learning definitions of a physicalist language in terms of a prior language of set theory, logic and observation” (Quine 1969: 76; emphasis added).  In fact, Quine had already put his finger on what seems to be the sheer impossibility of assuming such a cache of sophisticated logical ability some eighteen years earlier when he wrote in “The Two Dogmas of Empiricism:” 

“The language which Carnap adopted as his starting point [in the Aufbau] was not a sense-datum language in the narrowest conceivable sense, for included also the notations of logic, up through higher set theory. In effect it included the whole of language of pure mathematics. The ontology implicit in it (that is, the range of values of its variables) embraced not only sensing events but classes, classes of classes, and so on. Empiricists there are who would boggle at such prodigality.” (Quine 1980: 39; emphasis added)





With Quine’s rejection of “radical” reductionism in mind, where this rejection seems to turn on a somewhat implicit rejection of a form of Meno’s Paradox, let’s take two versions of what I characterize as the “naturalistic circle” into account. These two circles relentlessly plague naturalistic (empirical) philosophers, but, by rejecting the radical reductionism of the Aufbau (as it manifests itself in terms of Meno’s Paradox) Quine appears to have escaped both.

4.1 The Naturalistic Circle: Hume’s Version

According to Hume, the scientific method is a fallible method in the respect that its subject matter consists of “matters of facts.” (Hume 1978: 1.3) ​[13]​ This is the case because according to Hume, knowledge claims that are based on matters of fact are based on the relation of cause and effect. (Hume 1978: 1.3) However, no causal relation is, according to Hume, necessary, but instead, is a product of imagining certain constantly conjoined events as apprehended through any and/or all of our five senses. As a result, any causal relation can always be imagined otherwise without creating a contradiction. So, no matter of fact is necessarily true. Accordingly, because the scientific method is constructed from consideration of matters of fact, no result it yields is necessarily true (Hume 1978: 1.3). Consequently, by appealing to the scientific method to show that we must use the scientific method to philosophically examine the world, where a component of that world is the scientific method itself, one makes a claim that is not necessarily true. No claim derivative of the scientific method is necessarily true, even if it’s the claim: “We must use science to examine science.” As a result, it is simply not certain that we should be doing naturalized philosophy at all. This is what we may identify as Hume’s version of the “naturalistic circle,” a circle that Hume intermittently torments himself with, particularly in the Treatise.​[14]​ 
It’s no surprise then, that Quine, latter-day Humean empiricist that he was, puts his finger on this circle approximately two hundred years later in Roots of Reference. However, here, Quine locates the circle in a historical venue that preceded Hume by thousands of years:

“Ancient skepticism, in its more primitive way, likewise challenged science from within.  The skeptics cited familiar illusion to show the fallibility of the senses; but this concept of illusion rested on natural science, since the quality of illusion consisted simply in deviation from external scientific reality” (Quine 1974: 2-3)

Ancient skepticism challenged science from a “scientific point of view” because the concept of an illusion is itself a scientific concept; an “illusion” is, by definition, a “deviation” from an empirically confirmable fact. As a result, the idea that the senses are fallible—and thus susceptible to illusion—is itself a claim that is derived from the senses. This means that the claim “The senses are fallible” seems to be fallible itself, and thus, is susceptible to illusion. So, just as Hume would complain thousands of years later, it seems that science may be “challenged … from within” (Quine 1974: 2).​[15]​

 4.2 The Naturalistic Circle; The Physicalist Version

With the general structure of the Humean version of the naturalistic circle in mind, let’s now take a look at what I characterize as the physicalist version, which was brought squarely into focus by Quine. According to Quine, sense data, which he prefers to construe as “neural input,” is fragmented, which—at least at the level that Quine identifies as reception—consists  of experiences that we are in no way “aware” of. And so, these experiences, as explained above, could not possibly admit of knowledge, even knowledge in Quine’s behavioristic sense of the word. Rather, as explained earlier, according to Quine, “awareness” and so, any possibility for knowledge, only emerges at the level of perceptual similarity. In this respect, Quine’s epistemology is fearlessly “physicalistic”—the primary source of all our knowledge consists of nerves firing, where “awareness” of such events is decisively absent. Recall that this way of looking at data acquisition is opposed to Carnap’s “phenomenalism,” where the source of all our knowledge consists of mentalistic entities that are related (at least by R). Moreover, we are aware of them.
However, adopting the physicalist stance seems to incur another version of the naturalistic circle: If one assumes physicalism and attempts to reduce, or in other words, claims to translate knowledge, particularly, knowledge of scientific theory, to nerve inputs, where such input does not admit of knowledge, then it seems that such knowledge is effectively equated to something that is not knowledge, namely, “smells, noises, feels, flashes, patches of color and the like” (Quine 1974: 1). As a result, it simply follows that if we translate science, say, the scientific claim X “All our scientific theory may be reduced to physical input” to physical input, then all of science, e.g. in this particular case, X, is equivalent to nonsense; that is, mere “impacts on our sensory surfaces” (Quine 1992: 1). This then, is the physicalist version of the naturalistic circle, which Quine discusses tirelessly throughout his work.​[16]​

5	A Summary of What is at Stake

By now, it should be clear that Quine was faced with the following epistemological mess: If we “radically” reduce or translate knowledge to sense data it seems that:
a.) We must assume such knowledge in the sense data by way of the Gestalt psychologists’ “wholes,” or what Carnap preferred to call “elementary experiences.” This constitutes what we might call, after Quine, “phenomenalistic” radical reductionism. Yet as noted, according to Quine—with all suspect mentalistic overtures aside—this is simply impossible. The Aufbauian project smacks of the second horn of Meno’s Paradox, i.e., the idea that we would not seek knowledge if we already knew such knowledge, where in this case, Quine translates the problem of a lack of motivation to seek what we already know into bleak impossibility: It’s just not the case that in virtue of our “elementary experiences” and knowledge of R and all of set theory that we know all possible knowledge claims logically derivative of E and R. This would simply “be too much to ask” (Quine 1995: 13)
b.) If—unlike the Aufbau Carnap—we conclude that our sense input does not admit of knowledge, it seems that if we reduce, or in other words, translate scientific theory and/or knowledge into sense data conceived of from a physicalistic point of view (and so, engage in what we might call, after Quine, “physicalistic” radical reductionism), then knowledge, particularly knowledge of scientific theory, equates to nerves firing, and so, it seems, to nonsense. This is the physicalist version of the naturalistic circle.
c.) Regardless if we assume that knowledge is or is not present in the sense data (e.g. in terms of “elementary experiences”), empiricists widely accept the fact that empirical, and thus scientific claims, are fallible—as was made particularly clear by Hume. So, if the claim “We must use science to examine science” is a scientific claim, then it is a fallible claim; this is Hume’s version of the naturalistic circle, and it, “challeng[es] science from within.” (Quine 1974: 2)


6	The Solution: Naturalism Embraced; “Radical” and “Attenuated” Reductionism Rejected

Quine’s three-fold solution to this mess is, as I see it, quite simple although many aspects of it have been much contested.​[17]​   
a.’) We cannot, according to Quine, assume knowledge in our initial input. This means that Quine must flat-out reject Carnap’s “phenomenalistic” radical reductionism. If we do not, we simply assume too much, causing us to “boggle at [the] prodigality” (Quine 1980: 39) inherent in such an endeavor. Meanwhile, as Quine sees it, contemporary scientific research shows that our initial input (“reception”) does not admit of knowledge; science seems to favor the physicalistic approach. So, ironically,​[18]​ it seems that a simple Platonic Paradox appears to have justified Quine’s endorsement of contemporary scientific research, but quite independently of Quine’s pragmatic reasons for embracing naturalism. The paradox of “radical” reductionsim may have made it quite clear to Quine that it is just unreasonable to assume knowledge in our initial interface with the world. As a result, problem a.) is avoided; our initial input is not only bereft of knowledge (even as adults), we are, according to contemporary scientific research, born knowing virtually nothing.
b.’) However, if one translates knowledge claims into what science tells us constitutes our outermost interface with the world (i.e. fragmented sense data (“reception”)) one effectively translates knowledge into nonsense. Recall that this is the physicalized version of the naturalistic circle. To specifically avoid this predicament, Quine must claim that at best, knowledge claims are “evidence[d]” by stimulus, where the notion “evidenced by” is not, equivalent to “equivalent to.” (Quine 1981: 24)  In other words, by "evidence," Quine is referring to the significant but not comprehensive influence that sense data has on a sentence. According to Quine, to grasp the given sentence’s entire meaning, and likewise its truth value (and so to properly know it) it must be understood in terms of the theory it is embedded in.  As a result, this means that a rejection of “radical” reductionism entails a rejection of “attenuated” reductionism. For if a knowledge claim is not reducible to, and thus, is not equivalent to sense data, but instead, its meaning, and likewise, its truth value can only be obtained upon considering it in terms of the theory it is embedded in, it simply follows that there are no knowledge claims whose truth values may be obtained solely in virtue of empirical confirmation or disconfirmation. So problem c.) is avoided; knowledge, knowledge of scientific theory in particular, is simply not equivalent to nonsense. And as an added bonus, the “synthetic” dogma (“attenuated” reductionism) is revealed for what it is—a dogma.
c.’) With the rejection of “attenuated” reductionism, the expectation for “certainty” is also dropped because “the two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical” (Quine 1980: 41). For according to Quine, just as no claim may be proven true or false purely in virtue of sense data, no claim may be proven true or false purely in virtue of its meaning, where the latter (“analytic”) claims, it is typically alleged, admit of “certainty” and the former (“synthetic”) claims do not. But no claim, according to Quine, is “certain,” or in other words, is “necessary” (see also Quine 1976). As a result, it simply doesn’t matter if the scientific method, or our choice to employ it, is fallible. What does matter, according to Quine is that science works, “[the scientific, empirical method] is the best [method] we know” (Quine 1960:  4). Science allows us to make certain predictions about the world, which include predictions and hypotheses about scientific theory. And so, problem c.) is avoided; the Humean version of the naturalistic circle is simply irrelevant; it is a manifestation of misplaced expectations.
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^1	  Dreben also emphasized this point in the 1993 Carnap/Quine seminar that I attended at Boston University.
^2	  To frame our discussion in terms of Quine’s more comprehensive reaction to Carnap, realize that the other two circles are: [2] “The linguistic doctrine of logical truth” (Quine 1976: 108). This amounts to Carnap’s conventional doctrine of logical truth, as spelled out in the Logical Syntax of Language. According to Quine, on this account, we seem to have to already know logic to acquire logic. In particular, in order to accept a logical inference as logically valid, one must presuppose the validity of that very inference (c.f. Stroud (1955; 38-39) [3] Carnap’s brand of analyticity, which is not be confused with the linguistic doctrine of logical truth. For as Quine points out in a number of papers and letters to Carnap, and most famously in “The Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1950), to define analyticity, one must already have some definition of analyticity in mind. So, correspondingly, to know what ‘analyticity’ means in terms of grasping it by way of its definition, we must already know what ‘analyticity’ means (see “Truth by Convention” (1935) in Quine 1976 and letter #97 in Creath 1990.
^3	  See Richard Creath’s comments in his introduction to Dear Carnap, Dear Van, particularly: "Russell called for the rational reconstruction of our knowledge on the basis of sense experience and urged the narrowest and deepest selection of concepts [in Our Knowledge of the External World]. It seemed to speak directly to Carnap. In fact [Carnap] penciled in the margin of his copy 'This narrowing and deepening of the fundamental  postulates is my task!'" (Creath 1990: 24).
^4	  According to Carnap, there is no logical difference between concepts and objects. Rather, this difference is, at best, a psychological difference, and so, for the purposes of the Aufbau’s program, may be ignored (Carnap 1967:10). 
^5	  Note the following passage where Carnap makes it quite clear that at least in principle, all knowledge may be translated into E and R (where here, he is concerned with making it clear that by doing so, he may also account for the objectivity of knowledge): “Even though the subjective origin of all knowledge lies in the contents of experiences and their connections, it is still possible, as the constructional system will show, to advance to an intersubjective, objective world, which can be conceptually comprehended and which is identical for all observers” (Carnap, 1967: 7; emphasis added). That is, important for us to note, “all knowledge” is contained it, or in other words, “lies in” E and R. 
^6	  Carnap never intended to complete the constructional system in the Aufbau. Instead, he merely wanted to show in what respect it was possible (Carnap 1967: 176).  
^7	  Quine says “sense-datum language” (emphasis added) here, not “sense-datum” simpliciter. So, contrary to what we just saw in §2, it seems that Quine thought that in the Aufbau, Carnap was attempting to reduce all knowledge to a primary language about sense data, rather than to the sense data (and R) itself. And in some respects, Quine is correct, “quasi-analysis,” consists in constructing an analogous formal language about elementary experiences; particularly, the construction of the “basic relations” that obtain of elementary experiences. Nevertheless, Carnap clearly thought that “all knowledge lies in the contents of experiences and their connections” (Carnap 1967: 7), not just in sentences made about E and R. So we might take Quine’s insistence on referring to a sense datum language as an artifact of Quine’s behaviourism, where only sentences may be true or false, not mental entities (see for instance, Quine 1960: §30-31, 1992: 69,1995 90-92 and 1953). Meanwhile, so-called mental entities must be understood in physical terms (e.g. as nerves firing, etc. See at least Quine 1974: 34). However, regardless if in this respect Quine appears to be intermittently imposing his own epistemological predilections on the Aufbau, it may be argued that  its “radical” reductionism still seemed paradoxical to Quine, or at the very least, struck him as an impossible task (see above for more detail).
^8	  For more on Quine’s notion of holism, see at least: “The Five Milestones of Empiricism” (1975) in Quine 1981, 1991 and 1992: 13-16. Keep in mind though, that in “The Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine credits Duhem (1906) and Lowinger (1941) for initially working out the fundamentals of holism. Quine’s notion of “underdetermination” also comes into play here, but for our purposes, and given length restraints, we need not throw it into the mix. See Bergström (2004) for more detail.
^9	  This is part and parcel of Quine’s behaviorism; see at least Quine 1995 and 1992 where he gives a general outline of this position.
^10	  For more on the distinction between “reception” and “perception,” see at least Quine 1995: 17-18 and 1974: 2-4.
^11	  With all the technical subtleties of the synthesis that occurs with quasi-analysis aside. For as noted earlier, the point we must grasp is Carnap’s claim that all knowledge may, in principle, be reduced, or in other words, translated via logical equivalence (as manifest by theory of relations) to elementary experiences and R, regardless if the last step in this reduction (quasi-analysis) incurs a method of establishing “synthetic” equivalence. More importantly still, this is how Quine understood the Aufbau. Recall, for instance the following passage from “The Two Dogmas of Empiricism” where he writes: “Radical reductionism, conceived now with statements as units, set itself the task of specifying a sense-datum language and showing how to translate the rest of significant discourse, statement by statement, into it. Carnap embarked on this project in the Aufbau” (Quine 1980: 39; emphasis added). See also the passages cited above from From Stimulus to Science and “Epistemology Naturalized,” where Quine makes similar claims. However, as noted in footnote 6, it must be pointed out that at least at some level, Quine indicates that Carnap was not translating all knowledge into E and R, but instead, into certain statements about E and R. Either option however, as we see above, would have been problematic for Quine.
^12	  Moreover, Quine thought that despite all the logically machinery that Carnap appealed to in the Aufbau, he could not adequately account for our ability to make spatial identifications. For more on this, see at least Quine 1980: 40 and 1969: 76-77.
^13	  Hume identified this as the method of “experience.” (Hume 1978: xvi-xvii).
^14	  See especially Hume 1978:  268-9. 
^15	  Also see “Epistemology Naturalized” (in Quine 1969), where Quine specifically mentions the “Humean predicament” (1969: 72) in regard to Hume’s naturalistic method. Also see Pakaluk’s (1989) citations from Quine’s 1946 lecture notes on Hume, specifically 455, 457, 459.
^16	  See for instance, Quine 1974: 2-4, 1969: 71-72, 74-75, 83-84, 1981: 24, 1992: 1-20 and 1960: 2, 4. Note just one of these passages: “Science itself teaches that there is no clairvoyance; that the only information that can reach our sensory surfaces from external objects must be limited to two-dimensional optical projections and various impacts of airwaves on the eardrums and some gaseous reactions in the nasal passages and a few kindred odds and ends. How, the challenge proceeds, could one hope to find out about that external world from such meager traces? In short, if our science were true, how could we know it?” (Quine 1974: 2; emphasis added)
^17	  For some of these objections see Perspectives on Quine (1990), and The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, 1986 and 1998.
^18	  In the respect that Plato was, by no stretch of the imagination, a naturalistic philosopher. According to Plato, the way to the truth was by way of “pure” rationality, whereas empirical evidence only created confusion, if not knee-jerk relativism (see at least, the Theaetetus).
